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Introduction
Prerational intelligence is a new theme tackled by a year-long work of a
research group at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research. It assumes
that there is something like rational intelligence. While examples related
to prerational intelligence include most striking yet simple neuronal
mechanisms that give rise to astoundingly complex behavior – such as
the functioning of the digestive system of a lobster – some behaviors
related to human intelligence seem of a distinct quality.
Natural for a human, thinking appears very different from other natural
doing like digesting, for example. We cannot be smart or dumb at
digesting. Neither do we have a choice of doing it in a conservative or
unusual manner, nor is it done deliberately or at will. Many philoso-
phers and psychologists have attempted to find models that view think-
ing as similar to other inner mechanisms like digesting. But none have
arrived at a point satisfactory enough to prevent other researchers from
finding their own approaches, including those that contribute to the
field of artificial intelligence.
Perception – Reasoning – Action
There have been many ways to define the subject of artificial intel-
ligence. I choose to start with a definition given by Patrick Henry
Winston (1992, p. 5):
“Artificial Intelligence is the study of the computations
that make it possible to perceive, reason, and act.”
Assuming this definition, AI differs from most of psychology because
of its greater emphasis on computation, and it differs from most of
computer science because of its greater emphasis on perception,
2reasoning, and action. One of my points will be that the “reasoning” is
particularly essential for higher intelligent functioning. Reasoning
involves internal processes that make a subject “think” about what
might be the best way of acting before actually moving to act.
Cognition about world and alternate ways of acting in the world add a
quality able to differentiate between a smarter or a dumber individual.
The scientific goal of artificial intelligence is to determine which ideas
about representing knowledge, using knowledge, and assembling
systems explain various sorts of intelligence (Winston, 1992). Ideas
prevalent to the various theoretic approaches to intelligence in AI
include that intelligence emerges from the interaction of many simple
processes “in concert,” and that process models of intelligent behavior
can be studied in detail by using the computer.
In this paper, I will try to deal with the question of what concept of
intelligence evolves from the work in AI. I will focus on two central
paradigms that have found wide recognition, and I will keep short to
point out their most significant points. Before doing so, I will give a
brief historic account of the origins of the field of artificial intelligence.
A Generative Theory of Intelligence
“Artificial intelligence” is a synthetic term which – due to its suggestive
potential – has caused many misunderstandings and false expectations.
Its origin can be traced back to the year 1956. This year was important
in many respects. For example, the book “Automata Studies” came
out, compiling now famous articles in the field of cybernetics (Shannon
& McCarthy, 1956). It was also the year when Bardeen, Shockley, and
Brattain received the Nobel Prize for the transistor. Noam Chomsky was
about to publish his famous paper on syntactic structures, giving way to
a theoretic account of natural language (Chomsky, 1957). In 1956, the
Dartmouth Conference took place in Hanover, New Hampshire. Its
promotors were John McCarthy, at that time an assistant professor of
mathematics at Dartmouth College, Marvin Minsky, a Harvard junior
fellow in mathematics and neurology, Nathaniel Rochester, a manager in
information research at IBM Poughkeepsie, NY, and Claude Shannon,
who at that time was a mathematician at Bell Telephone Lab. The key
sentences in their proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation read as
follows (cf. McCorduck, 1979, p.93):
3“We propose that a two-month, ten-man study of artificial
intelligence be carried out during the summer of 1956 at
Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. The study is
to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of
learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle
be so precisely described that a machine can be made to
simulate it.”
Among the participants of the Dartmouth Conference were Allen Newell
of Rand corporation, and Herbert Simon, of Carnegie Tech. Together
with John Shaw, they had just completed their “Logic Theorist,” a pro-
gram which could prove mathematical theorems in Whitehead and Rus-
sell’s Principia Mathematica. This program embodied what one came to
call the information-processing approach of modeling. This approach
has the underlying position that theories of human voluntary behavior
are to be sought in the realm of information processing systems –
systems consisting of memories, processors, and control structures, and
which work on data structures. The central agreement among
researchers starting from this line is that, with respect to intelligent
behavior, a human is this kind of a system, being active, autonomous,
rule-governed, discrete, with limited structural and resource capabilities.
As a field of academic study, AI reaches to understand intelligence by
becoming able to produce effects of intelligence: intelligent behavior.
One element in AI’s methodology is that progress is sought by building
systems that perform: synthesis before analysis. Drastically, it is not the
aim of AI to build intelligent machines having understood natural intel-
ligence, but to understand natural intelligence by building intelligent
machines.
Symbolic Representation
It is one special feature of AI that it pays explicit attention to internal
symbolic representation and symbol manipulation as a basis of internal
processes referred to as “thinking.” In this perspective, AI went beyond
what was so far the main subject of information processing psychology.
While Neisser’s (1967) book was seen as a crystallizing point for a new
cognitive psychology by many researchers, it dealt only with perception
and basic processing and ignored higher mental functions such as
problem solving, concept formation, or planning. In their work for the
4Logic Theorist, Simon and Newell began to perceive what they later
called the symbolic-functioning capability of computers. Symbols were
conceived as signifying objects with access to meanings – designations,
denotations, and descriptions. The symbolic level, as represented in
the early work of Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1958) and also Bruner,
Goodnow, and Austin (1956), provides notions of plans, programs,
procedures, strategies; it also leans on views of rule-governed generative
systems (Chomsky, 1957).
Most importantly, the symbolic level was seen to allow studying mind
with its functional features and capabilities apart from regarding neural
architecture and its processes. As Minsky and Papert (1972) wrote in
their AI memo No. 252, “thinking is based on the use of symbolic
descriptions and description-manipulating processes to represent a
variety of kinds of knowledge  [...] control of the problem-solving
process is affected by heuristics that depend on the meaning of events.”
So for researchers in AI, brain, memory, or recall processes are not the
subject of study, but rather the meaning that can be associated with a
certain process through symbolic descriptions.
The Knowledge Paradigm
A central and widely recognized paradigm of AI is Newell and Simon’s
(1972) description of the general intelligent agent. They take an
abstract (functional) view of the memory possessions of an individual
and its ability to build on it in affecting the world, and they use the term
knowledge to refer to this functional quality. The agent has sensors to
perceive input from a task environment, and actuators to affect the out-
side world (cf. Figure 1). Specific to this view is that “Probehandeln” is
possible within the agent: Before acting on the world, an internal repre-
sentation is manipulated to observe the effect of alternative methods.
Methods are selected from an internal method store, and their explora-
tion is guided by general world knowledge also internally inspectable.
The questions leading particularly the work of Newell (1981) in the
early 80s were the following:
• What is the nature of knowledge?
• How is it related to representation?
• What is it a system has, when it has knowledge?
5The Knowledge Level Hypothesis was put forward in Newell’s plenary
address at the First National Conference on Artificial Intelligence in
Stanford, 1980 (cf. Newell, 1981). It assumes a distinct computer
systems level, above the program symbol level (and other levels like the
register-transfer level, logic circuit level, circuit level, and device level),
which is characterized by knowledge as the medium. Representations
exist at the symbol level, namely, data structures and processes that
realize a body of knowledge at the knowledge level. The connection
between knowledge and intelligent behavior is described by the
Principle of Rationality which states: If an agent has knowledge that
one of its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select
that action.
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Fig. 1   Functional diagram of general intelligent agent (after Newell &
Simon 1972, p.89; Newell 1981, p.2)
6Newell views as knowledge whatever can be ascribed to an agent, such
that its behavior can be computed according to the principle of ration-
ality. From this perspective, knowledge serves as the specification of
what a symbol structure should be able to do. More importantly, this
conception views knowledge as a competence – a potential for
generating action – and as an abstract quality that can never be actually
in hand.  According to Newell, it must be coupled with a symbol-level
representation and symbol-manipulating processes to become workable.
Newell and Simon (1972) assume a physical symbol system to be
present in any intelligent agent.
One of the main points in Newell’s approach is that logic  is a
fundamental tool for analysis at the knowledge level, and that logic
formalisms with theorem-proving procedures can be used as a
representation in an intelligent agent. The knowledge-level view in AI is,
so to say, an attempt to mathematize certain aspects of intelligence
(apart from considerations of its symbol-level realization), particularly
those that deal with rational behavior and logical reasoning in problem
solving. Logic-based formalisms have been used for expressing an
explicit set of beliefs for a rational agent. Such a set of beliefs –
expressed in some representation language – is what is typically meant
by the term knowledge base.
The logic-oriented (knowledge level) view has helped to clarify and
settle many debates that were going on up to the late seventies (Brach-
man, 1979). For example, different ways of describing knowledge such
as semantic networks, frames structures, slot-assertion notation, and slot-
and-filler notation were found to be notational variants with respect
to what can be expressed and what can be inferred (Charniak &
McDermott, 1985). The prominence these alternative notations still have
in many application fields derives from their “object-centeredness”
which gives the convenience of indexing knowledge by the entities that
the knowledge is about, and the whole area of object-oriented program-
ming grew up with it.
Deficiencies of a Purely Logical View
The attempt to reconstruct knowledge of the world in a set of logical
formulas (first-order predicate logic, in general) faces some crucial
problems that have long been known; for instance, when deciding on
7the immediate effects of an event, given an open-ended list of ways it
might be modified by context (the Qualification Problem; cf. McCarthy
& Hayes, 1969). This fact is illustrated in the following example
(Brewka, 1993):
Turning the key results in starting the car except when
• the battery is dead
• the wires are loose
• somebody has stolen the engine
• the key breaks off
• the tank is empty...
Even worse is the situation when specifying what does not change when
an event occurs (the Frame Problem; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969). For
example (cf. Brewka, 1993), we may want to describe that it is true that
Fred is in the kitchen in a present situation “105” and that the color of
the kitchen is red. If we consider a new situation resulting from Fred
going to the bathroom, we might describe this in the following set of
formulas:
Holds(in(Fred,kitchen),situation105)
Holds(color(kitchen,red),situation105)
situation106 =
 result(go(Fred,bathroom),situation105)
We might have a general formula accounting for the fact that if some-
one x has gone to a place y in a situation s that it is now true that x is
in y:
forall x,y,s.Holds(in(x,y),result(go(x,y),s))
Now it is possible to derive that Fred is in the bathroom in situation 106.
But what is now the color of the kitchen? There is no way to derive that
the color of the kitchen is still red in situation 106. If we want to be able
to do so, we need to write a “frame axiom” that assures so:
forall x,y,v,w,s.Holds(color(x,y),s) →
Holds(color(x,y),result(go(v,w),s))
Given any more complex world, the work of writing frame axioms will
hardly ever be finished.
8There are more problems. In predicate logic, we assume certain rules of
inference together with a set of axioms that constitute what is assumed to
be true in a domain of discourse. And we assume that a reasoning
process (theorem prover) has global access to all that. If an agent knows
a set of logical expressions {Li}, then this is by far no means equivalent
to what can – in principle – be inferred from {Li}. What a particular
person (an intelligent agent) knows, is somehow stored in memory and
has to be retrieved within an enormous body of knowledge before it can
be reasoned with. Aspects of computational efficiency and of resource-
limited processing come in when an action has to be reached under
restricted time (Konolige, 1983).
Even when the logical intellect could, in principle, be compared with
logical reasoning, further essential differences exist. The “axioms” of
an individual are not acquired in one leap but distributed over a long
time. Many knowledge items are specific to particular domains of
discourse (domain-specific). They are commonly tied to context, and
there is hardly a global view on what one knows. The cultural way of
passing knowledge on from teacher to student by way of instruction
involves that one may take new facts for granted without checking their
consistency with the previously known, i.e., there may be inconsisten-
cies. However, consistency of logical expressions is needed for a logical
reasoning process to be sound. Apparently, people are able to carry out
logical reasoning soundly within a given context.
Partitioned Knowledge
My research in the 80s has focussed particularly on domain specificity,
accessibility, and consistency of knowledge. Based on findings from an
empirical study with mathematics students lasting more than one year, I
came to postulate grouping effects in large knowledge bodies, and
principles in how knowledge is accessed. I found strong indication that
performance differences between subjects depended not only on the
soundness of the rules (“axioms”) they were able to apply but also on
the way their rules appeared to be accessible in context. Further findings
showed that the presence of certain concept words in a situation
description may trigger access to specific domain knowledge and
further vocabulary associated with this knowledge. Details of the study
and its findings are described in (Wachsmuth, 1989).
9The findings were elaborated to describe principles of how knowledge
elements are organized and accessed within a large body of knowledge
(Wachsmuth, 1989; see also Wachsmuth & Gängler, 1991). Knowledge
organization refers to how a collection of knowledge elements can be
structured (partially ordered) by way of set containment. This pertains
to different degrees of specificity as well as to different aspects in which
a specific body of knowledge may branch to extend in competitive sub-
bodies. Access conditions describe how knowledge is made available to
the processing system and how access is changed in the course of a task
situation. By way of partitioned knowledge bases, the approach gives a
logical account of competitive and locally consistent knowledge.
P1
P3
P4
P5
P7
P2
P9
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P8
   
Fig. 2  Access graph of a partitioned knowledge base with competitive
axioms. In the access condition shown, only such axioms associated with
focussed node P8 and nodes above P8 are eligible for the processing
system (from Wachsmuth, 1989, p.157).
In Figure 2, the access graph of a partitioned knowledge base is shown.
A node as P1 contains a subset of all expressions in a knowledge base.
Lower nodes contain more specific knowledge than the higher ones.
Knowledge associated with nodes shown bold is eligible for reasoning.
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The collection of knowledge elements eligible in each reachable access
condition must be locally consistent while the total knowledge base may
be inconsistent. The way a body of knowledge is structured embodies a
kind of local control in that it restricts the succession in which access to
knowledge is attempted in the fulfillment of particular goals.
In general, the conception of partitioned knowledge is meant to explain
how one is able to act on the basis of an enormous repertory of knowl-
edge elements without the confusion of facing all of them most of the
time. The empirical findings suggest that a critical feature of human
intelligence lies in a dynamic partitioning of the total knowledge in
visible and invisible parts such that the visible part is normally small
enough to be tractable. By way of extrapolation, this observation can
contribute to understanding the general problem-solving ability of
human beings, namely, by their ability to access appropriate subbodies
of knowledge based on clues from a task situation.
Modularity
In contrast to Newell’s principle of rationality which assumes that an
agent can take advantage of any and all information at its disposal,
Fodor (1983) has called attention to the fact that the mind could have
modular subsystems. At least, this seems to be true for perception and
motoric action (cf. Garfield, 1987). According to Fodor, the mind
comprises a number of modular systems dedicated to sensory and
linguistic input analysis and to linguistic and motor output. The
operation of these systems – for which he assumes specific, dedicated
neural architectures – is mandatory, i.e., they perform automatic func-
tions when given triggering stimuli. They are domain-specific in the
sense that, for example, dedicated modules operate only upon acoustic
signals taken to be utterances and which are different from those which
effect the perceptual analysis of auditory nonspeech.
Modular processes are informationally encapsulated in the sense that
they have access only to the information represented within the local
structures that subserve them. While domain specificity has to do with
the circumstances in which a module comes into use, encapsulation has
to do with the information that can be mobilized in the course of that
use. The speed observed with such processing is, in Fodor’s view,
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accounted for by the mandatoriness, the domain specificity, and the
encapsulation of modules.
Debates in the line of Fodor's (1983) proposal have questioned whether
modularity extends to central processes which appear to be optional and
deliberate (cf. Garfield, 1987). Yet the above discussion of partitioned
knowledge raises the question whether intelligent behavior crucially
depends on a global view of everything one knows, or whether there
could be a kind of functional modularity in reasoning that occurs on
the basis of restricted access to knowledge.
The Society of Mind Paradigm
A paradigm deviating from the notion of general intelligent agent has
been taken in Minsky’s (1986) perspective of “society of mind.” It is
an attempt to explain intelligence as a combination of many simple
processes which he refers to as agents. Agents that work together can
perform a task – as an “agency” – without each agent knowing any-
thing about the task; in total, intelligent behavior derives (cf. Fig. 3).
Special to Minsky’s reach for a theory of intelligence is that it tries to
span all the way from seemingly senseless simple mechanisms up to
higher intelligent functioning. Some agents do not do much more than
turn other agents on and off, and resolve conflicts by simply switching
among alternatives. Minsky also tries to point out more complex ways
for agencies to interact, by describing how agents could use cooperation
and compromise.
This paradigm assumes that intelligence is distributed among many
interacting smaller systems, thereby adressing the question how intelli-
gence could emerge from nonintelligence. Minsky’s themes include
very basic questions about agents like function, embodiment, inter-
action, and competence (How do agents work? What are they made of?
How do they communicate? How can groups of agents do what separate
agents cannot do?), and they reach up to high-level questions like
selfness, meaning, sensibility, and awareness (What gives agents unity or
personality? How could they understand anything? How could they
have feelings and emotions? How could they be conscious or self-
aware?)
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Minsky’s ideas have influence on the work of a growing number of
researchers in AI. Clearly, it leads to a quite different concept of intel-
ligence. Regarding technology, recent attempts to develop larger and
more complex knowledge-based systems have revealed shortcomings of
centralized, single-agent architectures and have acted as a springboard
for research in Distributed AI (DAI; cf. Adler et al., 1992; Müller,
1993). Multi-agent systems emphasize the aspect of task-related cooper-
ation of independent (autonomous) agents. An open spectrum of agent
types has been considered (Müller & Siekmann, 1991), reaching from
primitive (sensor-driven, reactive) agents through to “social agents”
with a “conscious” ability of interaction. Higher agents can have
knowledge of other agents and their skills. No agent has a global view
of the total problem to be solved, that is, there is no central control.
AGENT AGENT AGENT AGENT
AGENTAGENT
AGENT
etc.
Fig. 3   Seen by itself, an agent is just a simple process that turns other
agents on and off. Seen from outside, as an agency, it does whatever all
its sub-agents accomplish, using one another’s help (after Minsky,
1986).
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Situatedness
One of the most crucial problems in AI’s previous conceptions of
intelligence, as well as in many technical applications, is the fact that
world knowledge at one’s disposal can never be complete. This is due to
contextual variation and the multitude of situations to which an
intelligent agent could be exposed. The real problem for an agent is to
be able to act and survive in a changing world by way of mapping
external input to internal schemata, adapting schemata, and acting
without having a full internal description of the outside world.
New lines of AI research have given notice to the fact that the actions of
an intelligent agent may decisively depend on its involvement in an
actual situation. A situated agent integrates aspects of perception, action,
and communication in one system in order to succeed in a situation
without having a complete model of it (cf. Brooks, 1991). The term
“situatedness” refers to the ability of an intelligent system to exploit
the actual situation, to the extent possible, as a source of information in
perceiving and manipulating its environment and communicating with
cooperating partners. And it is crucial for Situated AI to deal with em-
bodied systems that are able to modify their internal processing while
they are coupled to their environment by way of sensors and actuators.
Some Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I tried to focus on some of the main ideas that the field of
Artificial Intelligence has to offer about the concept of intelligence.
Special to AI is that it views intelligence as computational, as based on
the processing of information by means of symbols. Computational
models of intelligent behavior allow the study of the implications of
theoretic assumptions through experimentation. That is, AI theories are
generative in the sense that they seek synthesis before analysis. Due to
the early subjects in AI which placed a heavy focus on problem-solving
and reasoning, rational intelligence was mainly the subject of study.
Accordingly, an extremely rational perspective was taken by Newell and
others building on the knowledge level hypothesis.
It is also clear that the concept of intelligence in AI is grasped in
different ways by different authors, and that the field is now in a process
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of changing paradigms. There was a recent move to contrast a “global”
account of intelligent behavior with more simple interacting systems that
may have different internal representations (or no representation at all)
in the field of Multi-Agent Systems and Distributed AI. This work has
extended to the study of embodied systems which are coupled in their
environment by way of sensors and actuators in Situated AI.
So far, no single approach has offered a perspective for reproducing or
explaining all features of intelligence as it was set for a program of
research at the Dartmouth conference (cf. McCorduck, 1979). The 1993
november issue of Scientific American quotes Minsky stating that “the
mind is a tractor-trailor, rolling on many wheels, but AI workers keep
designing unicycles.” While there is evidence that more and different
“wheels” are presently under consideration, many questions remain to
be solved.
A core question asks where prerational, adaptive intelligence leads into
rational, reflective intelligence. Human information processing can be
inflexible and automatic as well as flexible and controlled. Presumably,
it is largely by the use of symbols that we achieve voluntary control over
our thoughts. Thus it seems sensible to keep with the insights found
with rational intelligence and knowledge level abstraction, and observe
progress in the understanding of prerational intelligence. It is my im-
pression that models of multiple agents can help to find insights at the
borderline.
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